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Our paper integrates results from trade-in-task theory into mainstream trade theory by developing trade-
in-task analogues to the four famous theorems (Heckscher-Ohlin, factor price equalisation, Stolper-Samuelson,
and Rybczynski) and showing the standard gains-from-trade theorem does not hold for trade-in-tasks.
We show trade-in-tasks creates intraindustry trade in a Walrasian economy, and derive necessary and
sufficient conditions for analyzing the impact of trade-in-tasks on wages and production. Extensions of
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A growing list of economists argue that the nature of international trade is changing in important 
ways  (inter alia, Jones and Kierzkowski 1990, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006, 2008, 
Blinder 2006, 2009, Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter 2005, and Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001). 
Instead of simply creating more trade in goods, global integration is increasingly marked by 
“trade in tasks” – as Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) labelled it – that is to say, more trade 
of intermediate goods and services due to the widespread emergence of offshoring.  
This trend has elicited a substantial number of theoretical contributions that characterise the 
impact of this type of international commerce. To date, this body of theory is marked by a wide 
range of cases where unexpected outcomes are common – many of which seem to contradict 
standard trade theory’s received wisdom. 
The goal of our paper is threefold. First, we present a simple but flexible analytic framework in 
which both trade-in-goods and trade-in-tasks arise endogenously in response to exogenous 
changes in the cost of moving goods and ideas. Second, we use the framework to integrate 
results from trade-in-tasks theory into mainstream trade theory. For example, we develop trade-
in-tasks analogues to the four famous trade-in-goods theorems: Heckscher-Ohlin (HO), factor 
price equalisation (FPE), Stolper-Samuelson, and Rybczynski, and show that the standard gains-
from-trade theorem for trade-in-goods does not hold for trade-in-tasks (i.e. some trade-in-goods 
is always better than none, but the same cannot be said of trade-in-tasks when trade-in-goods is 
already possible). Third, we show that our framework can integrate the many special-case results 
in the offshoring/trade-in-tasks theory. Additionally we show that trade-in-tasks creates 
intraindustry in a Walrasian economy, and that extensions of the framework easily accommodate 
monopolistic competition and two-way offshoring/trade-in-tasks.  
Integrating trade-in-tasks theory with trade-in-goods theory is a challenge because they pose 
fundamentally different questions. Starting from a list of goods, factors and countries, mainstay 
trade theory studies the switch from no-trade to free-trade in goods. Trade-in-tasks/offshoring 
theory tackles a different intellectual exercise. Starting from an equilibrium where trade-in-goods 
exists, the theorist considers the impact of expanding the list of tradable goods – specifically of 
allowing ‘fragments’ of previously bundled production processes to be produced abroad, thus 
giving rise to trade in intermediate goods and services, i.e. trade-in-tasks.  3 
The key to our integration is a transformation that permits analysis of trade-in-tasks’ general 
equilibrium effects using the HO toolkit. The transformation turns on the insight that offshoring 
is like “shadow migration” – i.e. it is as if foreign factors migrated to the offshoring nation but 
were paid foreign wages. For example, the HO and HOV theorems fail to predict the trade-
pattern impact of trade-in-tasks; we show that the theorems hold when “shadow migration 
adjusted” endowments are used instead of actual endowments. Foreign factors employed in 
offshore production are potentially observable, so the resulting propositions should be testable 
with firm-level datasets. On the dual side, the vector of cost-saving generated by “shadow 
migration” can be use to transform the FPE and Stolper-Samuelson theorems in ways that predict 
factor-price effects. The trade-in-tasks equilibrium conditions thus transformed, the HO toolkit is 
used to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the wage, price, output, trade, and gains-
from-trade effects of allowing trade-in-tasks. 
1.1. The theoretical literature 
The early HO theory incorporated trade in intermediate goods (Batra and Casas 1973, Woodland 
1977, Dixit and Grossman 1982, and Helpman 1984) and the 1990s saw a number of informal 
analyses of fragmentation as well as some formal modelling (Deardorff 1998a, b, and Venables 
1999). Trade-in-tasks issues, however, were more recently crystallised by Kohler (2004a), 
Markusen (2006), Antràs et al. (2006), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008).  
The most commonly cited reference in the early offshoring/fragmentation literature is the 
informal analysis of Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), which seems to be the first to leverage the 
insight that fragmentation acts as technological progress and should therefore be expected – as 
per Jones (1965, p.567) – to have complex wage effects. This line of modelling typically worked 
with small open economies where fragmentation occurs in only one sector and in one direction. 
The analysis is largely verbal or graphical with the focus firmly on wage effects.
1 The gallery of 
special cases varies along three axes: the offshoring nation’s factor abundance, the factor 
intensity of the fragmenting sector and fragment offshored. Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), for 
                                                 
1 See Jones and Marjit (1992), Arndt (1997, 1999), Jones and Findlay (2000, 2001), Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1998, 2000), Jones, Kierzkowski and Leonard (2002), and Francois (1990a, b, c). 4 
instance, argue that workers whose jobs are “lost” to offshoring may, somewhat paradoxically, 
see their wages rise in some special cases.   
Among the mathematical formalisations of fragmentation, Deardorff (1998a,b) studies 
fragmentation in a multi-cone HO model where cost-saving offshoring is driven by non-factor 
price equalisation. The focus is on factor prices and showing that trade-in-tasks need not foster 
wage convergence. Venables (1999) works with a 2x2x2 HO model where offshoring is cost 
saving due to non-factor price equalisation arising from a factor-intensity reversal. 
Fragmentation occurs in only one industry and in one direction. Numerical simulations and 
Lerner-Pearce diagrammatic analysis are employed to study examples where trade-in-tasks 
produces wage convergence and divergence. Kohler (2004a) works with a small-open-economy 
specific-factor model where fragmentation can only occur in one sector. The focus is on the 
reward to the specific capital that moves offshore when fragmentation occurs, and the overall 
welfare effects on the home nation. Markusen (2006) works with a multi-cone HO model that he 
simulates numerically assuming that fragmentation occurs in the skill-intensive sector and the 
fragment is of middle skill-intensity. He typically finds that skilled workers gain. Kohler (2004b) 
works with a small open economy where fragmentation/offshoring can only happen in one 
sector, using the Dixit and Grossman (1982) model with a continuum of intermediate goods; he 
shows that cheaper offshoring raises or lowers factor prices according to the relative factor 
intensity of the two sectors and the fragments offshored. No formal results are presented on 
production and trade effects, nor are necessary and sufficient conditions developed in any of 
these papers. 
More recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) present a perfect competition model where 
two final-goods are produced using two continuums of tasks, each employing only one type of 
labour. Offshoring arises endogenously and the range of tasks offshored varies continuously with 
the cost of offshoring. The resulting wage effects are ambiguous in general, but they highlight a 
special case where both sectors offshore only unskilled labour tasks and yet unskilled wages rise 
while skilled wages are unchanged (see detailed analysis of this case in Section 3.4 below). The 
paper formalises the analogy between offshoring and technological change (the ‘productivity 
effect’) showing that trade-in-tasks, unlike trade-in-goods, can generate gains for all factors in 
the offshoring nation. The paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for wage-
changes in the two-factor-two-good small open economy case. It also explores the novel “labour 5 
supply effect” that influences wages when there are more factors than goods. Trade and 
production effects are not explored.  
Rodriguez-Clare (2010) embodies the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg approach in a Ricardian model 
à la Eaton and Kortum (2002). He studies the impact of trade-in-tasks on the gains from trade for 
the home and host nations. Global welfare rises due to offshoring’s productivity effect, but 
terms-of-trade effect can mean that the home nation losses despite this. Antràs et al. (2006, 2008) 
propose a model in which all tasks are potentially offshorable. The focus is on the formation, 
composition and size of (cross-border) teams when workers have different abilities (skills), and 
countries have different skill endowments. Among other results, they show that improved 
communication technology yields larger teams and larger wage inequalities. Their model also 
provides a trade-induced explanation for the rise in returns to skills. 
In summary, the trade-in-tasks/offshoring literature illustrates that standard trade theorems are 
not good at predicting the wage effects of allowing trade-in-tasks. The literature has not 
systematically explored the production and trade-pattern effects, nor has any attempt been made 
to systematically integrate the predictions of trade-in-tasks models with standard trade theory.  
1.2. Organisation of paper 
The next section introduces notation by presenting a slightly modified HO model. Section 3 
considers the impact of allowing offshoring/trade-in-tasks. Section 4 considers trade-in-tasks 
when the offshored intermediate goods/services can be sold to local firms instead of only being 
re-imported to the home nations as in the standard models. Section 5 shows the framework is 
flexible enough to be easily extended to allow for monopolistic competition and two-way 
offshoring. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Trade in goods 
To fix notation, this section presents an HO model modified slightly à la Trefler (1993); the 
modification creates an incentive for offshoring when the possibility arises in Section 3. 
There are two countries, Home and Foreign (Foreign variables distinguished by asterisks), F 
factors of production, and I perfectly competitive industries ( 1,..., f F   and  1,..., iI   index 
factors and industries respectively). The factor price, goods price, factor endowment, production, 6 
consumption and import vectors are denoted  {} f w  w ,  {} i p  p ,  {} f V  V , { } i X  X,   } { i C  C  
and  {} i M  M .
2 The I F   matrix  )} ( { ) ( w w A fi a   and its transpose 
T A  summarise Home’s 
constant returns technology with typical element  fi a  giving the cost-minimizing input 
requirement of factor f  in industry i as a function of w. Tastes are homothetic and identical 
across nations. We adopt standard regularity conditions to ensure that a unique equilibrium exists 
with diversified production.
 3 Our departure from the standard model is that Home is technically 
superior in the Hicks-neutral sense: 
Assumption 1 (homothetic technologies). All Foreign unit-input requirements are  > 1 
times higher than Home’s for any w* equal to w, (or – since factor demands are 
homogenous of degree zero – proportional to w). 
Such Hicks-neutral technology differences do not create Ricardian motives for trade. As is well 
known, the model can be mechanically transformed into a standard HO model by defining 
Foreign factor supplies in ‘effective units’, i.e. dividing 
*
f V  by the technology gap . We denote 
effective units of factors by “~”, so the world factor endowment in effective units is 
*/ 
w VV V  . 
The autarky equilibriums are characterised by market-clearing conditions M* = 0 and M = 0 as 
well as I pricing conditions and F employment conditions in each nation, which in familiar 
notation are:  
,   pA w p * A * w *    ,  
TT VA X V * A * X *   (1) 
where the arguments are suppressed, so A(w) and A(w*) are written as A and A*.  
                                                 
2 Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold letters; variables and parameters by italics, and Z > N 
means that each element of Z exceeds the corresponding element of N. 
3 The condition is that the V’s lie in the Chipman (1967) ‘diversification cone’, i.e. the space 
spanned by the columns of 
T A  evaluated at equilibrium factor prices.  7 
When trade becomes free, goods prices are equalised (law of one price), goods-markets clear 
globally (M* + M = 0), and (1) characterises the equilibrium but with a common p. Under 
standard regularity conditions, equilibrium production and price vectors are strictly positive.
4 
Throughout the paper, we assume A is invertible in which case the law-of-one-price can, and 
assuming no factor intensity reversals, must imply effective factor price equalisation (FPE), 
i.e.  * w w    – a fact established by simple manipulations of (1) using the fact that A = A* when 
w = w*.
5 With homothetic preferences, the common p, and A = A* due to effective FPE, the 
effective-factor-content of C must be 
w V
~
s  (s is Home’s share of world income). The factor 
content of Home production is V, so the pattern of trade must respect the HOV and HO 
theorems:  
s 
Tw AM V V       )
~
( ) (
1 V V A M
w T  
 s      (2) 
The third and fourth standard theorems consider the impact on w of an exogenous variation in p 
(Stolper-Samuelson theorem) and the impact on X of an exogenous variation of V 
(Rybczynski theorem); these follow from simple manipulations of (1) given that A = A* under 
free trade.  
The standard gains-from-trade (GFT) theorem states that some trade is better than none – 
ignoring intra-national distribution issues (Ohyama 1972, Smith 1982, Dixit 1985). As the GFT 
theorem analogue for trade-in-tasks does not hold (see Proposition 3), we review why it holds for 
trade-in-goods. By revealed preference arguments (Samuelson 1939, 1962, Kemp 1962), one 
equilibrium is preferred to another if the inferior equilibrium’s consumption vector is affordable 
at the preferred equilibrium’s prices. Denoting Home’s autarky consumption vector as Ca, the 
trade equilibrium is preferred by Home if  () 0   a pC C . Using M’s definition, the condition can 
be written as  0 ) ( ) (     a a X X p M M p . This inequality holds because: (i) the first term is zero 
due to balanced trade (pM = 0) and by autarky’s definition (Ma = 0), and (ii) profit maximisation 
                                                 
4 See the appendix of our working paper (http://www.dagliano.unimi.it/media/wp2008_250.pdf) 
for necessary and sufficient conditions for existence. 
5 While invertibility of A is far from innocuous (in particular, it requires I = F), the implications 
of relaxing the assumption are well understood (Ethier 1984).  8 
by Home firms implies the second term is positive. A symmetric result holds for Foreign, so both 
nations gain from trade. The logic holds even for partial liberalisations of autarky (Dixit 1985).  
3. Trade in tasks 
This section modifies the model to allow trade-in-tasks. Production in industry I involves Ni 
tasks indexed by  i N t ,..., 1  , Ni  2. Tasks are either segments of the physical production process 
(so the task’s output is an intermediate good, say wheels) or a slice of the necessary factor inputs 
(so the task’s output is a productive service, say accounting services). In the model described 
above, all tasks were bundled into the unit-input-coefficient vectors  1 {( ) }
F
fXf a  w . This implicitly 
assumed that all tasks in a given production process had to be performed in a single nation. Here 
we consider an exogenous change that allows the production process to function even when tasks 
are spatially unbundled – thus opening the door to offshore production and the attendant trade-in-
tasks. More specifically, each task involves a non-negative quantity of each factor f, so with 
constant returns,  fi a  can be written as the sum of task-level coefficients:   
I i F f a a
i N
t fit fi ,..., 1 ; ,..., 1 ; ) ( ) (
1      w w      (3) 
where  fit a  denotes the unit input requirement of factor f for task t in sector i. This allows 
substitutability of factors in the performance of individual tasks, but not of tasks. For, example if 
making wheels is one task then each car requires exactly 4 wheels; extra wheels cannot be 
substituted for the engine. A key additional assumption is:  
Assumption 3 (firm-specific technologies). Firms that offshore a task can do so using their own 
nation’s technology.
6  
This makes offshoring economical despite effective FPE. Home firms can combine their superior 
technology with lower Foreign factor prices, so Home-to-Foreign offshore may be economic; 
Foreign-to-Home offshoring will never be economic. One interpretation of this assumption is 
                                                 
6 The concept of what constitutes a firm does not seat easily with our otherwise Walrasian 
model. Section 5 shows that our results all got through in a monopolistic competition trade 
model where firms are well-defined; here we stick with the HO setting to improve comparison 
with the four theorems.  9 
that Foreign workers are themselves as productive or as well educated as Home workers but that 
Foreign technology or management practices are inferior to Home’s (Bloom and Van Reenen 
2007).  
To be concrete about the exogenous changes that allow trade-in-tasks, we introduce 
“coordination costs” i.e. the cost of exchanging information necessary to coordinate various tasks 
into a single production process. We introduce two types of coordination costs, within- and 
between-firm costs: 
Assumption 4 (within- and between-firm coordination costs). It costs  0 it    to offshore task-
t in sector-i to Foreign when other tasks are undertaken within the firm; it costs an 
additional  0  it   when the task is done by a separate firm.  
We think of these as the cost of moving ideas internationally and informally associate lower  
and  with advances in information and communication technology. Following standard 
offshoring theory, it varies across tasks. Routine tasks, which are easily codified, are cheaper to 
offshore than complex tasks that require frequent face-to-face interactions. To integrate trade-in-
tasks results with trade-in-goods theory (where the standard thought experiment is autarky-to-
free-trade), we focus on extreme changes in it. For the routine tasks, which we call type-1 tasks, 
the switch is from prohibitive to zero. For complex tasks, type-2 tasks, the coordination costs 
remain prohibitive. Without further loss of generality, we set  2 i N   for all i. Task  1 t   is the set 
of all tasks that can be offshored at zero coordination cost; task  2 t   is the set of tasks that are 
prohibitively expensive to offshore. 
In many offshoring models (e.g. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008), the offshored tasks are 
provided only within the firm; no sales to local unrelated firms are allowed. As this within-firm-
only assumption affects the general equilibrium in an important way, and it is not the only 
reasonable assumption, we consider variation in  0  it   that helps or hinders between-firm sales. 
Depending upon the nature of the task, it may be possible to coordinate production even when 
some tasks are performed by other firms – especially when the task does not involve firm-
specific services or components. In keeping with trade theory traditions, we consider two polar 
cases. The first takes the ’s as sufficiently high to make inter-firm trade-in-tasks uneconomical, 10 
i.e.  12 , ii   . The second takes  1 0 i    so the output of offshored tasks production can be 
bought by both Home and Foreign firms. We refer to the first case as the “no local sales” case, 
and the second as the “local sales” case. We study the no-local-sales case in the remainder of this 
section; Section 4 analyses the local-sales case.   
3.1. Free trade in tasks: No-local-sales of offshored tasks 
To explore the impact of trade-in-tasks, we start from the trade-in-goods equilibrium and – in the 
spirit of trade theory – consider the impact of an exogenous drop in  it  . Specifically, the 
coordination costs for offshore production of type-1 tasks (routine) switch from prohibitive to 
zero, while the coordination costs for type-2 tasks (complex) remain prohibitive. By the usual 
cost-savings logic, all Home production of type-1 tasks is offshored to Foreign (assuming 
standard regularity conditions that ensure diversified production in both economies).
7 Formally: 
Proposition 1 (trade-in-tasks occurs). Under regularity conditions that assure diversified 
production, all type-1 tasks are offshored from Home to Foreign in the trade-in-tasks 
equilibrium.  
Proof. Suppose that trade in type-1 tasks was possible but none occurred in equilibrium. As this 
prospective equilibrium is identical to the trade-in-goods equilibrium, w would equal w*, so by 
Assumption 3 an atomistic firm deviating from the prospective equilibrium would reduce costs 
by offshoring its type-1 tasks. The resulting pure profit contradicts the definition of a competitive 
equilibrium, so some trade-in-tasks occurs. To show that all Home firms offshore all type-1 
tasks, note that any firm that did not fully exploit the cost-saving opportunity would earn 
negative profits when competing with firms that did – provided only that w  w*. This factor 
price inequality is assured by diversified production as it is not possible for Foreign firms using 
the inferior technology to be competitive with Home firms unless w  w* by the pricing 
expressions in (1) (with p* = p). QED.  
                                                 
7 The appendix of our working paper (http://www.dagliano.unimi.it/media/wp2008_250.pdf) 
provides exact necessary and sufficient conditions for diversification in the 2x2x2 version of the 
model. 11 
Given Proposition 1, Home’s pricing and employment equations reflect Foreign-factor usage (for 
type-1 tasks), while Foreign’s pricing condition is unaffected (Foreign firms continue to use 
Foreign technology and pay Foreign wages). Foreign’s employment condition, however, reflects 
offshoring employment. In the no-local-sales case, all offshore task production is re-imported to 
Home, so Foreign employment in the offshore sector is proportional to Home’s production 
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1 w A fi a  , and  () 
**
OO AA w . From (4), we see 
the first main difference between trade-in-goods and trade-in-tasks: 
Proposition 2 (effective factor price divergence). Unless there exists a real number  in the 
unit interval such that    1 AA , trade-in-tasks forces a divergence of (effective) factor 
prices. (   1 AA  is the knife-edge case where the sets of type-1 and type-2 tasks have 
identical factor intensity.)  
Proof. The law of one price holds, so ()   
** * *
O1 O1 O O O AA wA w A w  given (4). If Proposition 1 
were false and effective FPE held, then 
*
O O w w     for some  1     and by Assumption 1, we 
would have  
*
OO AA  and  1 1 A A
*  , implying  O 1 O O 1 O w A A w A A ) ( ) (
1   
    . This 
expression can be true only if: (i) all factor prices are zero, which violates the zero profit 
condition; (ii) A1 = 0, i.e. no offshoring occurs, which violates Proposition 1; or (iii) the factor 
intensity of type-1 tasks are exactly proportional to aggregate factor intensity in each industries, 
i.e.    1 AA  for some  [0,1)  . Thus the supposition that effective FPE occurs under trade in 
task must be false unless (iii) is true. QED. 
Intuition for this result is simple. As authors from Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) to Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have argued, offshoring/fragmentation/trade-in-tasks is akin to 
technological progress for the offshoring nation. As the new trade involves a subset of tasks and 
offshoring is unidirectional, the technological change is non-homothetic and this destroys 
effective FPE. Intuition is further served by deviating from the long-standing tradition in the 12 
fragmentation/offshoring literature by considering the case where all tasks are offshorable. In 
this extreme case, no goods are produced using Foreign technology as such goods would be 
uncompetitive with goods produced using Home technology. In short, Home technology 
supplants Foreign technology globally, resulting in perfect factor price equalisation.  
Perhaps the most robust theoretical finding in trade theory is the HOV theorem. Does this hold 
when trade-in-tasks as well as trade-in-goods occurs? Given homothetic preferences, Home’s 
consumption vector is proportional to world output, i.e. 
w
O O X C s  , however solving for  O X  and 
*
O X  from (4): 

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   (5) 
The only circumstance in which this reduces to the standard HO expression in (2) is when the 
offshoring matrices  1 A  and 
*
1 A  are both zero – i.e. when no offshoring occurs. In short, given 
Proposition 1, we can say that the HO theorem breaks down with trade-in-tasks. 
The GFT theorem also breaks down – a result established by application of the Dixit (1985) 
technique for comparing restricted trading equilibriums.
8 Under our Walrasian assumptions, the 
cost of combining the output of type-1 and type-2 sets of tasks into a consumable good is zero, 
so we can readily apply Dixit’s result. We think of there being 2I goods (the two sets of tasks for 
each of the I goods) whose ‘shadow prices’ are the actual marginal production costs (i.e. 
including offshoring in the trade-in-tasks equilibrium). The relevant GFT condition is therefore 
0 ) (  C C p O O  where bars indicate the artificially extended vectors, and the price vector 
consists of the shadow prices (marginal costs). As before, this implies 
() ( ) 0    OO O ppMpX X  due the definition of imports and the fact that trade balance implies 
0   O OM p M p . Profit maximisation assures that  ()  OO pX X  is positive, but the term 
()  O ppM can be positive or negative; indeed, this is the Laspeyres index of Home’s terms-of-
                                                 
8 In independent work, Markusen (2010) derives a result; assuming all goods are traded 
domestically and some also internationally, he shows that allowing more to be traded 
internationally yields ambiguous GFT with a terms of trade improvement being a sufficient 
condition for a gain.  13 
trade loss when trade-in-tasks is allowed. Offshoring could, for example, boost global production 
of Home exports more than Home’s imports, engendering a terms-of-trade loss. Relative output, 
however, could fall in the opposite direction, so the terms-of-trade impact is ambiguous. 
Isomorphic reasoning implies Foreign GFT are also not assured, but the zero-sum nature of 
terms-of-trade effects alerts us to the fact that at least one nation must gain from offshoring. If 
goods prices are unaffected by trade-in-tasks, Home gains and Foreign is unaffected (Foreign is 
also strictly better off in the model of Section 4). Formally (proof in the text), we write: 
Proposition 3: (ambiguous GFT from trade-in-tasks). Trade-in-tasks is Pareto improving if 
terms-of-trade are unaffected and global welfare rises in all cases as terms-of-trade 
effects disappear at the global level. If Home or Foreign loses from trade-in-tasks, then 
the other nation must gain. A necessary condition for a nation to lose is that it 
experiences a terms-of-trade loss.  
3.2. The integrating framework: The shadow migration approach 
Proposition 2 and expressions (4) and (5) reveal that trade-in-tasks ruins much of the HO 
model’s elegance, and this for three reasons. First, by Proposition 1, Home and Foreign choose 
different positions on their isoquants so the A matrices are not proportional. Second, even if 
techniques were invariant to factor prices (Leontief), (4) shows that Home and Foreign goods are 
produced with different technologies where the differences are non-homothetic except in the 
knife edge case of  O A A   1 . Third, some Foreign factors use Foreign technology while others 
use Home technology. Each problem disrupts the elegant flow of HO logic.  
A key contribution of our paper is to suggest a transformation of the model that restores much of 
the HO elegance and does so in a way that enables us to integrate trade-in-tasks theory into the 
received body of trade-in-goods theory. It also allows us to integrate the wide range of special 
cases considered in the offshoring literature. The transformation turns on the insight that 
offshoring is like “shadow migration”.  That is, Home firms employ Foreign factors to produce 
tasks using Home technology, so offshoring affects the equilibrium in a way akin to migration of 
Foreign factors to Home assuming the migrated factors were paid foreign wages rather than 
Home wages.  14 
The shadow-migration transformation has two manifestations – one for quantities and one for 
prices – with each involving the introduction of a new vector. The shadow migration vector, 




* . The offshoring cost-saving vector, denoted as S, equals the difference between the 




1 O 1 w A w A  . Both are 
potentially observable given modern datasets as they require only information on the offshored 
production (in addition to the usual information of w’s, X’s and A’s).  
Approximating around the trade-in-goods A(w), the trade-in-tasks employment conditions in 
terms of shadow-migration-adjusted endowments (denoted  O V  and 
*
O V ) are: 
12 ,   
T* T *
OO O O VA XRV A * XR       ( 6 )      
where the Foreign shadow-migration-adjusted endowment is  V V V
* *
O     with 
0
*    O
T
1 X A V , and R2 is the remainder from a Taylor expansion of A around w weighted by 
*
O X .
9 Also,  O V  and R1 are the Home versions of 
*
O V  and R2 with an additional approximation 
that comes from the fact that (due to effective factor price divergence)  V   may not exactly 
equal the vector of Home factors that would be necessary to produce the offshored tasks, i.e. 
3 O R V V V      where  
R3 equals  
* 
TT
11O AAX . Similarly, the transformed pricing equations are: 
6 O O 5 O O R w A p R Aw S p     





1 O 1 w A w A S    is the vector of cost-savings, and the R’s are Taylor expansions 
arising from the approximation around A(w) as before.  
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The R’s are negligible – and the trade-in-task employment and pricing conditions,  (6) and (7), 
are isomorphic to those of the HO model, (1) – in two cases: (i) when the changes in the ’s are 
such that the scale of offshoring is modest, so factor-prices changes are modest and A changes 
are second-order-small by the envelope theorem; and (ii) when the technology is such that the 
afi’s are not very sensitive to factor prices so A changes are modest even for large factor-price 
changes; Leontief technology is the extreme of fully insensitive technique choices implying all 
R’s are identically zero.  
Using the shadow-migration transformed employment conditions, (6), and approximating the 

















       (8) 
where  V V V
w w
O    
 ) 1 (
~ ~ 1  . Inspection of this yields (proof in the text): 
Proposition 4 (trade-in-tasks analogue to HO and HOV theorems). The pattern of goods-
trade in the trade-in-tasks equilibrium is explained by the HO theorem where actual 
endowments are replaced by shadow-migration-adjusted endowments.  
This is subject to the usual provisos that apply to higher-dimension versions of the HO and HOV 
theorems (see Ethier (1974, 1984), or Dixit and Norman (1980)) as well as the well-known 
provisos that come with Taylor-expansion approximations. 
A number of implications of this proposition are noteworthy and potentially testable. Switching 
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The HOV theorem asserts that the left-side should be zero (see (2)), but with trade-in-tasks:  
Corollary 4.1: The difference between the factor-content predicted by the HOV theorem and the 
measured factor-content of Home’s import vector, A
TMO, is proportional to but smaller 
than the shadow migration vector V.  16 
For example, in the 2x2x2 case where Home is skill-abundant but coordination costs are such 
that the offshored tasks are particularly unskilled intensive, Home’s shadow-migration-adjusted 
endowment is skewed towards unskilled labour, so, as per Proposition 4, it may import the skill-
intensive good for reasons that are conceptually different from the exogenous Ricardian 
differences suggested by Leontief (1953) and confirmed by Trefler (1993).  
If the offshored tasks are intangible – e.g. accounting services – Home will be importing 
‘invisible’ tasks from Foreign. As the factor content of this could be measured with data on 
offshore production, predictions for the total factor content of ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ trade may 
be testable. From (9), 
1 () ( 1 ) ss 
       
wT
O VV A M V V   and combining this with 
Corollary 4.1 we have: 
Corollary 4.2 (bounded HOV errors): In the presence of trade-in-tasks, the standard HOV 
factor-content prediction,  V V
w 
~
s , should overstate the factor-content of final-goods 
trade but understate the factor-content of final-goods trade plus that of trade-in-tasks. 
More precisely, the factor-content of final-goods and traded tasks are A
TMO and V 
respectively, so the following bounds should hold:  V M A V V M A O
T w
O
T     
~
s .  
The proof is by inspection of (9) noting that every element of V is non-negative. 
If the offshored tasks yield firm-specific intermediate goods, we have: 
Corollary 4.3 (intraindustry trade): If the offshored tasks produce intermediate goods then 
intraindustry trade must arise. 
Proof. Every sector offshores some task (Proposition 1) so Home’s vector of imported 
intermediates is strictly positive. From Proposition 4, Home exports some final goods, so Home 
engages in intraindustry trade in each of its export sectors (assuming the intermediate goods are 
classified in the same industry as their corresponding final good). QED. 
Corollary 4.4 (source of comparative advantage): Offshoring is a source of comparative 
advantage in the sense that trade-in-tasks creates trade-in-goods that would not occur 
otherwise.  17 
The general proof is simply a restatement of the fact that offshoring alters the pattern of trade, as 
per Proposition 4 or inspection of (8). Intuition, however, is served by illustrating Corollary 4.4 
with an example. Consider the special case where Home and Foreign have proportional factor 
endowments (i.e.  * V V b  , b > 0), so no trade occurs in the trade-in-goods equilibrium. 
Allowing trade-in-tasks creates trade in final goods (except in the usual knife-edge case 
  1 AA ) as Foreign will export the output of type-1 tasks (Proposition 1) and Home must 
export final goods to balance trade.  
Proposition 5 (trade-in-tasks analogue to FPE theorem). Starting from the trade-in-goods 
equilibrium, allowing trade-in-tasks produces a divergence in effective factor prices that 
is proportional to the value of the cost-saving stemming from trade-in-tasks.  
The proof is by inspection of (7). Under the trade-in-goods equilibrium, effective factor price 
equalisation, 
* w w   , holds. Trade in tasks changes all goods and factor prices, in general, but 
the effective factor price gap – ignoring Taylor expansion remainders – is:  
S A w w
1 *
O O
          ( 1 0 )  
QED.  
An implication, whose proof is by inspection of (10), is: 
Corollary 5.1 (shadow migration not necessarily a substitute for real migration). From 
Proposition 5, shadow migration can widen or narrow the international wage gap for each 
type of labour, so offshoring may increase or decrease the pressure for real migration.  
Given (6) and (7), and assuming the Taylor expansion remainders are negligible, analogues for 
the Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems are straightforward. From (6), approximating 
the remainders as zero,  O
T
O X A V  , so  ) ( ) (
1 V V A X
T
O   
  while before trade-in-tasks 
V A X
T 1 ) (
  ; analogous expressions hold for 
*
O X  and 
* X . Inverting the Home pricing equation 
in (7),  ) ( S p A w O
1
O  
  while under the trade-in-goods equilibrium,  p A w
1   ; Foreign 
wages are only affected by price changes. With   O pp p , the equations of change are: 18 
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Proposition 6 (trade-in-tasks analogue to Rybczynski theorem). Starting from free trade-in-
goods, allowing trade-in-tasks affects production in exactly the way predicted by the 
standard Rybczynski theorem with the implied ‘shadow migration’ replacing the usual 
exogenous variation of factor endowments. Standard Jonesian magnification effects 
occur.  
This is subject to the usual provisos that apply to higher dimensional versions of the original 
Rybczynski theorem. Also: 
Proposition 7 (Trade-in-tasks analogue to Stolper-Samuelson theorem). Starting from free 
trade in goods, allowing trade-in-tasks affects Home factor prices in exactly the way 
predicted by the standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem with the vector of cost-savings 
from offshoring S coming in addition to the usual exogenous variation in prices.  
This is subject to the usual provisos that apply to higher dimensional versions of the original 
Stoler-Samuelson theorem.  
The proofs are by inspection of (11), noting that the production-change and the wage change 
problems have been reduced to the standard Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
thought-experiments (respectively), so the impact on production is as predicted by the 
Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems.  
Standard trade theory rarely addresses the impact of free trade on global output. With trade-in-
tasks, however, there are important and systematic global changes in output since shadow 
migration expands the effective world endowments, i.e.  
ww
O VV  . From (11) and the definition 
of X
W we get: 
V A X X
T W W
O    
  1 1 ) )( 1 (       (12) 
Proposition 8 (global production effects). If trade-in-tasks produces shadow migration in only 
one factor, then global production of at least one good must rise and that of at least one 
other good must fall.  19 
Proof is by the usual Ethier (1984) approach to the I x F version of the Rybczynski theorem.
10 
 As a minor corollary, we note the expansion of the shadow-migration-adjusted world 
endowment vector is proportional to the augmentation of Home’s shadow-migration-adjusted 
endowment, thus the global production effects tend to be proportional to Home’s production 
effects as shown by comparison of (11) and (12).  
3.3. The 2x2x2 example 
The 2x2x2 version of the HO model is a key source of theoretical insights for trade-in-goods and 
a workhorse of the offshoring/trade-in-tasks literature. Here we present the analytic solutions for 
the trade-in-tasks and trade-in-goods equilibrium in a 2x2x2 example.  
The two factors (skilled labour K and unskilled labour L) are paid r and w, respectively and work 
in the X and Y sectors. X is numeraire and L-intensive (i.e.  YX     where  / iK i L i aa    for i = X, 
Y). Foreign is abundantly endowed with unskilled labour (i.e.  * kk   where  / kK L   and 
** / * kK L  ). To ensure diversified production with free trade in goods, we assume 
* YX kk     when the ’s are evaluated at the equilibrium factor prices.  
Inverting expressions in (1) yields solutions for w’s and X’s in the trade-in-goods equilibrium: 
, ) ( , , ) ( ,
1 1 V* A X* p A w* V A X p A w
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and from global market-clearing: 
                                                 
10 From the employment condition of the expanding factor, we know that the proportional 
expansion in the factor equals the average of the proportional changes in outputs weighted by 
employment-shares (Jones algebra). From the employment condition for some non-expanding 
factor, we know that the employment-share-weighted average proportional changes in output 



























Here  () (0 ,1 )    denotes the equilibrium expenditure share on Y.  
Next consider the trade-in-tasks equilibrium. Solving (6) and (7) for XO and wO (ignoring the 
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1 O O KX O O LX X r r a w w a S      and 




1 O O KY O O LY Y r r a w w a S     .  These are examples of Proposition 6 and 7, and we note that 
Jonesian magnification effects are in operation.
11  
Expression (14) shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for signing production and wage 
effects of trade-in-tasks. Rather than write out the results in the form of propositions, we 
depicted the full range of outcomes in Figure 1. For example, if shadow migration is heavily 
skewed towards L (specifically, K/L is less than the capital intensive of X, X) then X rises and 
Y falls. If shadow migration has an intermediate factor ratio, namelyX < K/L <Y, then both X 
and Y rise. Finally, if it is heavily skewed towards K (K/L > Y) then X falls and Y rises. 
Foreign production effects are characterised in an isomorphic manner.  
Figure 1: Necessary and sufficient conditions for wage and production effects due to trade in 
tasks. 
                                                 
11 For example, X/X = {(L/L) /(1- k/Y) - (K/K)/(Y/k-1)} and k/Y < 1 since both economies’ 
product is diversified.  21 
 
Turning to the wage effects, we see from (14) that the wage of Home L-workers rises 
(controlling for terms-of-trade effects) if and only if the cost-saving is sufficiently greater in the 
L-intensive sector than in the K-intensive sector, namely  // X Y KX KY SS a a  ; in this case r rises 
less or actually falls. The necessary and sufficient condition for r to fall (controlling for relative 
prices), is that the ratio of cost-savings exceeds the ratio of L-input coefficients, 
// X YL X L Y SS a a  . If the cost-savings ratio lies between the skilled-unskilled endowment ratios 
then both w and r rise by the direct effect. Apart from terms-of-trade effects, i.e. p, trade-in-
tasks has no effect on foreign wages in the no-local-sales case we are considering (this changes 
in the local-sales case considered below).  
3.4. Integrating special cases in the literature 
The theoretical trade-in-tasks literature has focused on special cases. Here we illustrate how the 
various cases fit together. As most the literature works with what are effectively 2x2x2 models 
and ignore terms-of-trade effects (i.e. small country assumption), we follow suit. In this case, the 
impact of offshoring on w and r are given by the bottom row of (14) taking p = 0. 
Many papers assume that offshoring occurs in only a single sector. This includes Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1990) and follow-on papers,
12 Deardorff (1998a), Venables (1999), Kohler (2004a, 
b), and Markusen (2006). In such papers, either SX = 0 or SY = 0, so offshoring acts like sector-
specific technical progress. The wage effects thus depend on the factor intensity of the 
                                                 
12 For example, Jones and Marjit (1992), Arndt (1997, 1999), Jones and Kierzkowski (1998, 
2000), and Jones, Kierzkowski and Leonard (2002). Francois (1990a, b, c) explicitly considers 
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progressing sector; offshoring only in the L-intensive X sector raises w and lowers r; while 
offshoring only in Y does the opposite, as (14) shows. 
Other papers consider offshoring involving only one factor but in both sectors, so offshoring is 
like factor-specific technical progress, specifically 
*
1() XL X OO Saw w   and 
*
1() YL Y OO Saww  . 
As is well known, factor-specific technical progress has ambiguous effects on w and r (Jones 
1965); what matters is the relative size of the cost savings by sector – the necessary and 
sufficient conditions are summarised by the left-panel in Figure 1.  
Perhaps the most famous special case in the literature is the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006) result (repeated in the main body of analysis of their 2008 paper) that unskilled labour 
unambiguously gains from the offshoring of unskilled-intensive tasks while the other factor’s 
wage effect is exactly zero. How does this fit in with the ambiguity apparent in (14)? As it turns 
out, the result is driven by the concatenation of three normalisations. Working in what could be 
boiled down to a 2x2x2 model, they describe each sector’s production process as involving two 
continuums of tasks – one that uses only L, the other only K. The four continuums are 
normalised to the unit interval, and within each continuum, tasks are normalised to use the same 
amount of the relevant factor. After ordering the tasks by increasing offshoring costs, they 
normalise the offshoring costs across sectors. In the famous special case, only L-tasks are 
offshoreable, but the three normalisations imply that exactly the same fraction of L is offshored 
in X and Y. In our notations  ) (
*
O O LX X w w a S     and  ) (
*
O O LY Y w w a S    , where  is the 
endogenous fraction. As (14) shows, proportional offshoring of a single factor produces the 
famous special case. Specifically, all the cost-saving goes to L, i.e.  0  r rO  and 
) (
*
O O LX O w w a w w     . Ambiguity of the wage effects is restored in subsequent analysis in 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) when the cross-sector normalisation is dropped, or 
offshoring of H-tasks is allowed. 23 
4. Offshoring with local sales 
In the previous section, all output of the offshored sector was ‘sold’ to Home. Here we allow 
local sales of offshored tasks by assuming the inter-firm coordination costs, the ’s, are zero.
13  
With zero inter-firm coordination costs, Home firms have an incentive to sell type-1 tasks to 
Foreign producers as their superior technology gives them an edge over local producers. Taking 
all remainders as zero in this sector to reduce clutter, the pricing and employment equations with 
local sales of offshored tasks are: 
,* ; ,        
*T T *
OO O O pSA w pS A w VΔVA X V * ΔV* A X    (15) 
where S and V are defined as in Section 3, but now Foreigners benefit directly from 
offshoring’s cost saving, so  0 ) ( ) 1 (
*     O O 1 w w A S*   and 
*
O
TX A V*  . Importantly, S* > 
0 means Foreign wages are directly affected by trade-in-tasks whereas they were only indirect 
effected via terms-of-trade effects in the no-local-sales case. Solving (15) and (1) for wages: 




O        
       (16) 
The expression for Home factor prices is isomorphic to the no-local-sales case in the previous 
section (although the values of SX and SY may change since the factor prices will in general be 
different).  
There is a crucial difference, though, between the factor price effects on Home versus Foreign 
labour. For Home labour, it is rents that generate the cost-savings (i.e. the fact that Foreign 
workers are paid less than their average products); for Foreign labour it is technology transfer 
that generates the cost-savings. Nevertheless, the Foreign wage changes in (16) are isomorphic to 
those of Home. Consequently, all the detailed analysis in the previous section relating the cost-
savings to the wage effects is now applicable to the impact of offshoring on Foreign wages with 
*
X S  and 
*
Y S  substituted for SX and SY.  
Solving (15) for production and using (13) yields: 
                                                 
13 This version of the model can also be thought of as capturing long-run technology spillovers 
brought about by FDI. In an augmented model, local Foreign firms might close the technology 
gap by learning from the presence of Home offshore production. 24 
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     
Qualitatively, the impact on Home production is the same as in the service-offshoring case in the 
previous section. The impact on Foreign production, however, is qualitatively different and the 
shadow migration interpretation is less clear-cut – note in particular that the signs of the elements 
of V, namely L* and K*, are now ambiguous, though effective world endowments of L and 




 . In the no-local-sales case, Home 
offshored technology that was used only for Home production, so the Foreign labour employed 
in the offshoring sector was diverted from Foreign production and this meant that the Foreign 
production change was proportional to the Home production effect but of the opposite sign. Here 
the tech-transfer embodied in offshoring tends to stimulate Foreign production, so this simple 
proportionality breaks down. Nevertheless, the basic analysis of production effects for Foreign 
follows the reasoning of Proposition 4 and Figure 1 with X
* substituted for
 X. Since the trade 
effects follow from the production and factor price changes, it is clear that offshoring in the 
local-sales case at hand will also be a source of comparative advantage and intra-industry trade.  
To summarise, the main difference between the two cases is that offshoring with local-sales 
spreads some of the benefit of the implicit technology transfers to Foreign factors whereas in the 
no-local-sales case all the benefits accrued to Home factors (modulo terms of trade effects). 
5. Extending the basic model  
The integrating model can be easily extended to allow Ricardian differences among nations that 
result in two-way offshoring – a common phenomenon among OECD nations (Amiti and Wei 
2005) – and to incorporate monopolistic competition a la Helpman and Krugman (1985).  
5.1. Intra-industry two-way offshoring
 14 
Davis (1995) shows that intraindustry trade arises in a HO-like model due to minor technological 
differences among nations when there are more goods than factors. As many production patterns 
are consistent with (1) when I > F, even minor technological advantages can shift global 
production of individual goods to a single nation. We apply this insight to generate two-way 
                                                 
14 We would like to thank Toshi Okubo for providing the idea for this section. 25 
trade-in-tasks that arises from task-level technology differences across nations (e.g. Italy may be 
especially excellent at making brakes for small cars, while France may be especially excellent at 
making air bags for small cars, even though France and Italy are roughly at parity when it comes 
to small car technology).  
To implement this idea cleanly, we eliminate all macro differences between Home and Foreign 
by assuming  = 1, and V = V*. The trade-in-goods equilibrium is thus marked by absolute FPE 
and zero trade. There are, however, task-level technology differences in the sense that Foreign’s 
task technology is as in (3), but Home’s task technology is now: 
I i F f a a
i N
t fit it fi ,..., 1 ; ,..., 1 ; ) ( ) (
1      w w        
where  [1-, 1+] is a random variable that is iid across sectors and tasks, symmetrically 
distributed around E{ } = 1 and with  > 0.  
Assuming coordination costs such that  0  it   and  0  it   for all i and t, all tasks are potentially 
offshorable and firms can supply tasks to one another. We also assume that Ni is sufficiently 
large for all industries (or assuming a continuum of tasks) so that afi(
.) is the same in Home and 
Foreign; thus, factor prices are equalised and Home is competitive in all tasks where it < 1; 
Foreign is has the edge in all other tasks. To see this, note that the cost of producing task t in 
sector i at Home is  
F
f fi fit it w a
1 , while the cost of producing it in Foreign is isomorphic with 
all the ’s set to unity. Assuming the Ni’s are large, the law of large numbers implies that Home 
has the edge in half the tasks sector-by-sector. Moreover, the tasks in which Home has the 
Ricardian comparative advantage will be a random sample of all tasks, so the Home employment 
condition will be: 






   
As Home and Foreign are symmetric at the macro level, it is clear that trade-in-tasks will have no 
impact on the w’s or X’s, but intraindustry offshoring and intraindustry trade-in-tasks will arise. 
There are no terms-of-trade effects, so gains from trade-in-tasks are assured. To see this, note 
that  
3 1
24 11 F     
TT T T
O AA A A  holds (by the law of large numbers), where F(
.) is the 
CDF of . Further, all factor owners are better off if preferences are homothetic; to see this, note 26 
that   O ww  follows by unit cost pricing (
1   OO O wA p  and 
1   wA p ) and homothetic 
preferences imply   O pp . 
5.2. Offshoring in a Helpman-Krugman trade model 
A fact that has been well appreciated in trade theory since Helpman and Krugman (1985) is that 
the basic HOV results carry through unaltered in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition 
setting provided that the increasing returns technology is homothetic, i.e. the cost function is (mx 
+ F)faifwf where the summation is over all factors, m is a parameter that governs marginal cost, 
x is firm-level output, and F is the standard fixed cost. Here we use this insight to show that the 
above analysis could easily be conducted in a monopolistic competition trade model setting.  
The key to the Section-3 analysis lies in the pricing and employment equations and their 
restatement using the shadow migration insight. As is well known, the free-entry output of a 
typical variety under monopolistic competition with homothetic technologies depends only on 
cost and taste parameters and so does not vary across the equilibriums we consider. This implies 
that monopolistic competition sectors display constant returns at the sector level (doubling 
sectoral output at equilibrium would require double the inputs), specifically,  x n X   is the 
sector’s total output where x  is the invariant firm-level output. The sector’s employment of 
factor f is thus  if a x F m x n ) / (   where i is the Dixit-Stiglitz sector. Likewise the price of the 
Dixit-Stiglitz sector equals average cost, namely  f
F
f if w a x F m   
1 ) / ( . Choosing units such that 
x F m /   is unity, the employment and pricing equations for this model are identical to those of 
the HO model of Section 3, as are the Foreign pricing and employment conditions. With this, we 
have reduced the problem to the one solved in Sections 3, so can conclude that the relevant 
Propositions also in a model that allows monopolistic competition. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Recent theoretical contributions have renewed interest in characterising the effects of offshoring 
and the result has been a wide range of cases that generate unexpected results – many which 
seem to contradict intuition based on standard trade theory. This paper is an attempt to integrate 
the theoretical trade-in-tasks literature into standard trade-in-goods theory. We present a simple 27 
modification of the HO model that allows us to consider trade-in-goods in the traditional sense 
(i.e., the exogenous shift from no-trade to free-trade in goods) as well as trade-in-tasks (i.e. the 
exogenous shift from no-trade-in-tasks to free-trade in a range of routine tasks).  
The expressions for the trade and production patterns, and goods and factor prices are highly 
complex in the trade-in-tasks equilibrium and clearly violate the standard HO predictions. 
However, if one views offshoring as ‘shadow migration’, and uses shadow-migration adjusted 
endowments instead of actual endowments, the HO trade and production predictions work 
perfectly. As such, we can use the elegant HO theorems to establish necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the trade and production effects of offshoring. As the quantities of factors 
employed in offshore production is potentially observable with firm-level datasets, these trade-
in-tasks analogues of the HO, HOV and Rybczynski theorems are testable in principle. We also 
show that offshoring creates intra-industry trade when the various tasks are considered as being 
in the same sector. On the price side, we show the using the vector of the cost-savings the 
‘shadow migration’ produces can be used to develop trade-in-tasks analogues of the FPE and 
Stolper-Samuelson theorems.  
Our integrating framework does not encompass the many important contributions in the 
offshoring literature that focus on issues of corporate governance, e.g. Grossman and Helpman 
(2002). These papers typically focus on the division of rents and how they depend upon the 
corporate structure chosen. As the division of rents will affect the division of the benefits from 
offshoring, we conjecture that it could have significant general equilibrium effects as well as the 
more direct effects on ownership. Incorporating such issues would seem to be an important topic 
for future theoretical research.  
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